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Monetary compensations in climate policy  
through the lens of a general equilibrium assessment:  
The case of oil-exporting countries 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the compensations that major oil producers have claimed for since the 
Kyoto Protocol in order to alleviate the adverse impacts of climate policy on their economies. 
The amount of these adverse impacts is assessed through a general equilibrium model which 
endogenizes both the reduction of oil exportation revenues under international climate policy 
and the macroeconomic effect of carbon pricing on Middle-East’s economy. We show that 
compensating the drop of exportation revenues does not offset GDP and welfare losses 
because of the time profile of the general equilibrium effects. When considering instead 
compensation based on GDP losses, the effectiveness of monetary transfers proves to be 
drastically limited by general equilibrium effects in opened economies. The main channels of 
this efficiency gap are investigated and its magnitude proves to be conditional upon strategic 
and policy choices of the Middle-East. This leads us to suggest that other means than direct 
monetary compensating transfers should be discussed to engage the Middle-East in climate 
policies. 
 
Keywords: monetary transfers; oil exporters; climate policy 
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Monetary compensations in climate policy  
through the lens of a general equilibrium assessment:  
The case of oil-exporting countries 
 
The compensation of developing countries for the adverse impacts of climate change and 
climate policies is one of the constant stumbling blocks of international climate negotiations. 
These adverse impacts encompass three distinct issues: climate change damages, higher 
energy prices affecting households’ purchase power and firms’ production costs and the 
reduction of exportation revenues in fossil fuel producing economies. Historically, it is under 
pressure of Middle-East countries and the Organization of the Petroleum-Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) that these concerns have been officially acknowledged at different stages of 
international negotiations, since article 4.8 of the UNFCCC1 and article 3.14 of the Kyoto 
protocol2 (Barnett and Dessai, 2002) until, more recently, Article 1 of the 2009 Copenhagen 
Agreement3. 
This repetition is the sign that no tangible progress could be made about this sticking point of 
climate negotiations in the past decades. This impasse has obvious political roots, i.e. the 
reluctance of developed countries to grant large transfers towards countries perceived as rent 
seekers, especially in a context of public budget constraint. But, beyond this political 
dimension, compensations based on monetary transfers raise questions about both their 
amount and their efficiency for sustaining economic activity in a general equilibrium vision. 
This paper tries and frames these two sides of the compensation problem. 
The first question relates to the evaluation of climate policy losses in oil-exporting countries, 
which defines the compensations but remains a controversial topic in the literature. General 
equilibrium energy-economy models predict significant costs4 whereas dynamic partial 
equilibrium models find moderate losses5. These opposite conclusions are related to the 
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assumptions underlying the two approaches. The former conventionally assumes optimized 
trajectories under perfect foresight and flexible technical and market adjustments, which 
comes down to overlooking the potential co-benefits of climate policies permitted by the 
correction of baseline sub-optimalities. The latter do not consider the feedback effects of the 
oil sector on macroeconomic indicators and hence do not account for the reduction of world 
oil demand under climate policy, a potentially major adverse impact on oil-exporting 
economies. One ambition of this paper is thus to provide a comprehensive assessment of the 
cost of climate policy in oil-exporting countries through a combination of these two 
approaches, i.e. in a hybrid top-down/bottom-up framework (Hourcade et al, 2006).  
The second question relates to the effect of monetary transfers on economic activity and 
welfare in the recipient country, which has been investigated in a large body of literature on 
the empirics of “development aid and growth”. A recent survey by (Doucouliagos and 
Paldam, 2011) shows however that no univocal message can be derived from existing 
assessments. Some support the idea that development aid promotes growth,6 whereas others 
find it growth-neutral7 or even contributing to depress activity through indirect mechanisms 
undermining aid effectiveness (Rajan and Subramanian, 2005). Among these, (Rajan and 
Subramanian, 2011) typically demonstrate the role of real exchange rate overvaluation when 
trade effects and structural lock-ins are accounted for. This mechanism is a source of the 
‘natural resource curse’ through its negative effect on local competitiveness and socio-
economic development (e.g., Sachs and Warner, 2001; Frankel, 2010; Ross, 2012). It is a 
particularly important dimension for the evaluation of monetary compensations in Middle-
East countries and it calls for endogenizing terms-of-trade adjustments.. 
We try and respond these two methodological challenges through a hybrid Computable 
General Equilibrium (CGE) energy-economy model that captures the limited flexibility of 
technical and economic adjustments under imperfect foresight, describes the domestic effects 
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of adjustments on the terms-of-trade and endogenizes long-run structural change in response 
to price signals and geopolitical strategies (Section 1). This model is used to estimate the 
socio-economic consequences of an international climate policy on oil markets and its adverse 
impacts on Middle-East countries in terms of exportation revenues and macroeconomic 
activity (Section 2). This assessment serves as a basis for estimating the monetary transfers 
Middle-East countries may claim for in a climate policy context under two options depending 
whether they compensate losses of oil revenue or of economic activity (Section 3). An 
analytical study demonstrates that general equilibrium effects in a second-best setting create 
the risk of an efficiency gap, i.e. that the ex-post benefit of transfers is lower than predicted 
with an ex-ante calculation, and isolates its crucial determinants (Section 4). Finally, 
numerical assessments confirm the relatively poor efficiency of monetary transfers to actually 
sustain economic activity in Middle-East economies (Section 5). Section 6 concludes on the 
implications of this analysis for international negotiations and, in particular, on the trap of 
reducing the compensation problem in climate negotiations to a question of monetary 
transfers. 
 
1. Modelling long-term oil markets in a globalized economy  
This paper adopts the IMACLIM-R model, which has been developed for the analysis of energy 
and climate issues at a long-term horizon, and this section summarizes its specificities that are 
of particular importance for the topics of this paper. 8  
 
1.1 General structure of the IMACLIM-R model 
IMACLIM-R is a recursive CGE model of the world economy, which endogenizes the interplay 
between the dynamics of oil markets and the macroeconomy over the 2001-2050 period 
through the recursive succession of annual static equilibria and dynamic modules (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: The recursive and modular structure of the IMACLIM-R model  
 
 
The static equilibrium represents short-run macroeconomic interactions at each date t under 
technology and capacity constraints. It is calculated assuming Leontief production functions 
with fixed intermediate consumption, labour inputs and mark-up in non-energy sectors9. 
Households maximize their utility through a tradeoff between consumption goods, mobility 
services and residential energy uses considering fixed end-use equipment. Market clearing 
conditions lead to a partial utilization of production capacities, given the fixed mark-up 
pricing and the stickiness of labour markets. This equilibrium provides a snapshot of the 
economy at date t in terms of relative prices, wages, employment, production levels and trade 
flows.  
The dynamic modules are reduced forms of bottom-up models, which describe the evolution 
of structural and technical parameters between t and t+1 in response to past and current 
economic signals. At each year, regional capital accumulation is given by firms’ investment, 
households’ savings, and international capital flows. On that basis, the across-sector 
distribution of investments is governed by expectations on sector profitability and technical 
conditions as described in sector-specific reduced forms of technology-rich models (referred 
to as Nexus modules and described in details in the Supplementary Material of (Waisman et 
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al, 2012)). The Nexus modules represent the evolution of technical coefficients resulting from 
agents’ microeconomic decisions on technological choices, given the limits imposed by the 
innovation possibility frontier including a) sector-based information of economies of scale, 
learning-by-doing mechanisms and saturation in efficiency progress, and b) expert views 
about the asymptotes on ultimate technical potentials, the impact of incentive systems, and the 
role of market or institutional imperfections. The new investment choices and technical 
coefficients are then sent back to the static module in the form of updated production 
capacities and input-output coefficients to calculate the t+1 equilibrium. 
This structure comes to adopt a standard putty-clay representation with fixed technical content 
of installed capital, which allows distinguishing between short-term rigidities and long-term 
flexibilities (Johansen, 1959).10  The consistency of the iteration between the static 
equilibrium and dynamic modules relies on ‘hybrid matrices’, which ensure an explicit 
representation of the material and technical content of production processes through a 
description of the economy in consistent money values and physical quantities (Sands et al., 
2005). In this multisectoral framework with partial use of production factors, market 
imperfections and adaptive expectations, growth patterns may endogenously depart from the 
natural rate given by exogenous assumptions on active population and labour productivity 
(Phelps, 1961). 
 
1.2 Description of oil markets  
The description of oil supply in the IMACLIM-R model captures three crucial determinants of 
oil exploitation at different time horizons (Rehrl and Friedrich, 2006):  
• heterogeneous (conventional and non-conventional) oil reserves distinguished by their 
exploitation cost, expressed in dollars per barrel ($/bbl);  
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• geological constraints limiting the short-term adaptability of oil supply and its long-term 
availability;  
• the market power of Middle-East countries and their ability to influence world oil prices 
through their production decisions.11 
In addition, macroeconomic interplays in IMACLIM-R include lessons from econometric 
studies on the macroeconomic effects of the first oil shock (Hamilton, 2008). We incorporate 
five model specifications that have been proven as necessary to reproduce the observed 
magnitudes of macroeconomic effects consecutive to oil price variations: 
• mark-up pricing to capture market imperfections (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1996); 
• partial utilization rate of capital due to limits in the substitution between capital and 
energy (Finn, 2000);  
• a putty-clay description of technologies to represent the inertias of capital stock 
(Atkeson and Kehoe, 1999);  
• frictions in the reallocation of capital across heterogeneous sectors causing 
differentiated levels of idle production capacities (Bresnahan and Ramey, 1993); 
• frictions in the reallocation of labor across heterogeneous sectors causing 
differentiated levels of unemployment (Davis and Haltiwanger, 2001). 
 
The empirical evidence behind these two groups of model specifications and the 
implementation of these principles into the IMACLIM-R are more extensively discussed in 
(Waisman et al, 2012b). 
 
1.3 Specifications for international trade  
In IMACLIM-R, all intermediate and final goods are internationally tradable and total demand 
for each good is satisfied by a mix of domestic production and imports. Energy flows are 
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represented in physical quantities whereas all other goods are described with Armington 
specifications to capture imperfect substitutability among goods produced in different regions 
(Armington, 1969). Domestic as well as international markets for all goods are cleared (i.e. no 
stock is allowed) by a unique set of endogenous relative prices (the ‘terms-of-trade’), which 
adjust to maintain the equilibrium of the balance of payments defined by the sum of trade 
flows and capital flows. 
The endogenization of capital flows has hardly been operationalized in global-scale energy-
economy models (a notable exception being (McKibbin et al., 1999)) because of a lack of 
shared empirical evidence12 and unresolved controversies in the economic literature about 
capital mobility13. This is why we resort to exogenous assumptions on the dynamics of capital 
flows, defined by the net balance between capital exports and imports, including the return to 
foreign direct investments. Base year imbalances on capital flows are explicitly represented 
through the calibration of capital imports/exports observed in 2001 and their dynamics is 
governed by an exponential decrease representing a progressive correction of international 
capital imbalances by 2050.   
 
1.4 The climate policy in IMACLIM-R 
A climate policy in the IMACLIM-R model is defined by an exogenous carbon emission profile 
which defines, at each date, the maximum level of carbon emissions from the production and 
use of fossil energies (coal, oil and gas) in final goods and in transformation processes. When 
this maximum is binding (i.e., allowed emissions are lower than in the baseline), a carbon 
price is introduced: at each date, its level is endogenously calculated so that the increase in the 
cost of fossil energies triggers a decrease of their use consistent with the climate constraint. 
Associated revenues are collected by the government which then reallocates them to 
households and/or firms through transfers. When considering international climate regimes, 
 10 
international permit market can be modeled by defining regional allocations and introducing 
transfers according to the difference between these and real emissions. 
 
2. Oil markets and the costs of climate policy 
In this section, we consider the ‘ideal’ case of a world agreement on a Kyoto-type climate 
architecture with full participation, including the free compliance of Middle-East countries14. 
Although this assumption may seem unrealistic, this scenario defines a useful benchmark to 
assess the adverse impacts of a climate policy on major oil producers. 
For the sake of comparability of the results, we consider a unique climate objective 
throughout the paper, defined by a stabilization of CO2 atmospheric concentration at 450 ppm 
(parts per million). This target limits the temperature increase to +3°C, which seems more 
realistic than the +2°C objective conventionally put forward in climate negotiations, and 
comes down to imposing a peak of world CO2 emissions between 2010 and 2020 and a 
decrease by 30% in 2050 with respect to 2000 levels (Barker et al., 2007, Table TS2) (Figure 
2a). For the sake of simplicity, emission allowances defining the regional distribution of 
mitigation efforts are decided according to a “Contraction and Convergence” principle in all 
scenarios (Figure 2b)15 
Figure 2. (a) World CO2 emissions under climate policy (GtCO2) [left-hand panel]; (b) Regional quota allocation 
(GtCO2) [right-hand panel]. 
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For the sake of simplicity, we assume common assumptions on all the technical and 
behavioral determinants of energy-economy trajectories, but sensitivity of model outcomes to 
these assumptions are studied in other specific papers16. The only variant concerns oil price 
trajectories, about which the literature on the strategic response of OPEC to various profiles of 
carbon prices often concludes that major oil producers would adopt a limited deployment of 
production capacities (IPCC, 2001, section 8.3.2.3). The rationale behind such behavior is to 
cut back production to trigger price increases and hence maintain revenues despite the drop of 
oil consumption (e.g., Berg and al., 1997b). However, low short-term oil prices may also have 
some advantages in a climate policy context by simultaneously accelerating short-term oil 
consumption and limiting the incentive for oil-free technical change to sustain long-term oil 
demand. This is why we consider two oil pricing trajectories mimicking alternative reactions 
of Middle-East producers: 
- The Limited Deployment scenario (LD): Middle-East producers refrain from investing 
in new capacity and maintain the medium term oil price around phigh=90$/bbl. This scenario 
follows the standard conclusion of high prices permitting to extract oil rents as soon as 
possible before the climate policy reduces significantly oil demand. 
- The Market Flooding scenario (MF): Middle-East producers expand their production 
capacities and bring the oil price back to its pre-2004 level, plow = 50$/bbl. This strategy is an 
example of the “green paradox”, according to which the introduction of a climate policy is an 
incentive for oil producers to accelerate the extraction of resources (Sinn, 2008) 
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2.1 Carbon pricing and oil markets under climate policy 
The carbon price follows a similar trajectory under the two oil pricing strategies, with three 
distinct periods (Figure 3a).  
Figure 3. (a) Carbon price ($/tCO2) [upper-left panel]; (b) Oil price ($/bbl) [upper-right panel]; (c) World Oil 
demand (Million b/d) [lower left panel]; (d) Total cost of a barrel of oil, including carbon costs ($/bbl) [lower-
left panel] 
 
During the first years of the climate policy (2010-2025), Middle-East producers have enough 
leeway on the deployment of their production capacities to control oil prices, which are 
therefore almost unaffected by the climate policy (Figure 3b). High carbon prices are 
necessary to ensure a steady increase of the cost of oil for final users (Figure 3d) in turn 
triggering the decrease of oil consumption necessary to comply with the reduction of carbon 
emissions (Figure 3c). Under the MF scenario, the increase of carbon prices is sensibly 
steeper (89$/tCO2 in 2025 vs. 70$/tCO2 under the LD scenario), but total oil demand remains 
more important (105 Million b/d at the maximum vs. 97 Million b/d in the LD scenario) 
because of lower total cost of a barrel. 
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Between 2025 and 2040, carbon prices stagnate and even decline in both scenarios but remain 
above 50$/tCO2 (Figure 3a). This level proves sufficient to tap most mitigation potentials in 
power, residential and industrial sectors, which represent the core of emissions reductions at 
that medium-term stage of the climate policy (Barker et al., 2007, Figure TS27). Oil demand 
declines continuously (Figure 3c), because the post Peak Oil rise of prices (Figure 3b) triggers 
a steady increase of end-use costs (Figure 3d). During this period, carbon prices remain lower 
under the LD scenario, because the economy benefits from accelerated carbon-free technical 
change triggered by a higher cost of fossil fuels in the previous period. 
After 2040, the exhaustion of all cheap mitigation options forces a steep increase of carbon 
prices in both scenarios (from around 60 $/tCO2 in 2040 to 120$/tCO2 in 2050). This rise of 
carbon prices is necessary to tap the high-cost mitigation potentials in the transportation 
sector, which become important only above 100$/tCO2 (Barker et al., 2007, Figure TS27). Oil 
prices are lower than in the baseline scenario since carbon pricing accelerates fossil-free 
technical change and thus reduces the long-term oil dependency of the economy. This impact 
of carbon prices on oil prices is moderate in the LD scenario, while particularly important in 
the MF scenario (Figure 3b), which is very dependent on oil in the baseline.  
Although the MF scenario confronts a depressing effect on oil prices and short-term oil rents, 
Middle-East countries may find a rationale for adopting this strategy in a climate policy 
context. In particular, maintaining low oil prices like in the MF scenario helps oil exporters to 
protect the oil share in energy markets under a climate policy, by redirecting the mitigation 
efforts towards a more intense reduction of coal. Indeed, in the MF scenario, consumer oil 
prices (including the carbon tax) are lower than in the LD scenario during almost all the 
period (Figure 3d), and world oil demand proves to be higher over the whole period 2010-
2050, with a significant cumulative difference amounting to 94 Billion bbl (12.9 GToe). Table 
1 shows a similar effect for gas (19% higher cumulated gas consumption in the MF scenario) 
 14 
because of the indexation of gas prices on oil prices when they remain sufficiently low. Given 
the identical climate objectives forcing identical carbon emissions in total  the higher oil and 
gas consumption under MF scenario must be offset by lower coal production (12% less 
cumulative production over 2010-2050). Although the numerical differences are moderate in 
terms of cumulated production, the next section will show that this will have significant 
impacts on exportation revenues over the period. 
 
Table 1. Cumulated production of fossil fuels under climate policy over the period 2010-2050 (GToe) 
 Oil Gas Coal 
LD scenario 182.3 97 162.6 
MF scenario 195.2 115.1 142.9 
Relative difference (MF vs LD) + 7% + 19% - 12 % 
 
2.2 The climate policy and Middle-East countries’ economy 
Unsurprisingly, whatever the oil pricing strategy, the introduction of a carbon price induces a 
significant drop of oil revenues in Middle-East countries (Figure 4). Note that this measure 
compares the level of revenues reached in the two different baselines with that under climate 
policy. This comes down to assuming that Middle-East’s choice between MF and LD is less 
influenced by the climate policy than by the intrinsic time preference characterizing the trade-
off between short- and long-term effects.17 
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Figure 4. Reduction of oil exportation revenues under climate policy (Billion $) 
 
In the short-term, as discussed in section 2.1, price levels are almost unaffected by the climate 
policy and the reduction of oil exportation revenues is due to the drop of oil demand. In the 
longer term, price effects enter into play and magnify the revenue losses, especially in the MF 
scenario where costs reach $10 700 Billion over the whole period, or 26% of cumulated oil 
revenues,. This is because the climate policy delays Peak Oil and minors its consequences in 
terms of rising prices, hence strongly limiting the high long-term profits Middle-East 
countries receive in the baseline case. This effect is also at play under the Low Deployment 
scenario but with a lower magnitude so that cumulative losses are limited to $6 000 Billion 
over 2010-2050, or 16% of total oil revenues.  
Figure 5. GDP variations under climate policy. 
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Less intuitive is the somewhat different picture obtained by observing the macroeconomic 
losses in Middle-East countries (Figure 5). 
Over the short-term (2010-2020), the contraction of economic activity reaches a very 
significant 12.5% losses, which corresponds to an average 1% reduction of growth rates over 
2010-2020 (3.5% instead of 4.5%). This is due to the sharply upward-oriented carbon prices 
at this time horizon and to inertias on the renewal of technologies and end-use equipment 
which inhibit the capacity of producers and consumers to escape the increase of their energy 
bill. These effects cause significant increases of production costs and final prices undermining 
competitiveness of non-energy sectors and consumers’ purchase power. Those effects 
combine to generate a drop in final demand, a contraction of production, higher 
unemployment and an additional weakening of households’ purchase power. Although valid 
for any region, these mechanisms are particularly important in Middle-East countries because 
of the high fossil-intensity of production process driving high energy costs (especially when 
compared with labour costs), and of the high share of energy expenditures in households’ 
budget.18 
Over the long run, despite the permanent gap in oil revenues, macroeconomic activity 
experiences a recovery phase and GDP levels in 2050 are very close to baseline levels (only 
1% and 3% losses under MF and LD scenarios, respectively). This means that a drop of oil 
revenues as experienced under a climate policy is not necessarily univocally penalizing for 
economic activity. This can be analysed as the end of the ‘natural resource curse’ (Sachs and 
Warner, 2001). In the present case of an exogenous assumption about the current account 
balance, lower oil exportation revenues imply a lower exchange rate of local currencies 
favoring the competitiveness of domestic industries. The climate policy then fosters local 
production at the expense of industrial goods importation and induces a faster 
industrialization in Middle-East countries which better prepares Middle-East’s economies to 
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the post oil era. Long-run economic activity is less sensitive to oil revenues and those 
revenues fall into a more mature production structure apt to absorb them efficiently. This is 
critically illustrated by the MF scenario, in which almost the same GDP levels are reached in 
2050 despite 25% lower oil revenues at that time horizon.   
Figure 6. Surplus variations under climate policy 
 
Figure 6 provides the corresponding variations of households’ surplus S∆  between baseline 
and policy scenarios, as defined by S R CVI∆ = ∆ − , where R∆  and CVI  are the effective and 
compensative variation of income respectively. This indicator is commonly admitted as a 
better indicator than GDP in the context of important changes of the structure of prices 
because it accounts for the policy effects on households given their consumption preferences 
and constraints (see the survey on the decomposition of welfare effects in CGE models in 
(Gohin, 2005) and the applications to the context of climate change in (Bernard and Vielle, 
2003)) 
The general surplus trend is similar to GDP variations with important losses in the short-term 
and a long-term partial recovery. But, contrary to GDP trends, the magnitude of the effects is 
notably different in function of the pricing scenario. This is particularly true in the short-term 
where welfare losses are amplified under MF scenario (up to 18%). In this case indeed, the 
introduction of a carbon price has an important effect on end-use energy prices compared to a 
low baseline oil price. Therefore, it undermines more households’ purchase power. At a 
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longer term horizon, the recovery of surplus levels proves to be less important than the 
recovery of GDP: surplus levels are still around 5% lower than in the baseline in 2050. Again, 
the inertias limiting the changes of consumption patterns hamper the reduction of oil-intensity 
for final demand. In particular, constrained mobility needs for daily travels (essentially, 
commuting and shopping) force the consumption of fossil fuels without increasing welfare 
levels. 
 
3. Climate policy and Monetary Compensations (MC) for oil producers: 
framing the debate. 
 
The previous section has demonstrated that, although the costs of the climate policy are 
significantly reduced when considering economic activity instead of oil revenues, 
macroeconomic assessments still feature a risk of high costs in Middle-East economies, 
especially in the transitory period. This assessment confirms the intuition that the international 
community will have to think of complementary measures to limit the adverse impacts of 
climate policies to gain the compliance of major oil-exporting economies. We consider now 
the simplest of such measure, i.e. the implementation of Monetary Compensations (hereafter 
denoted as MC) for which two rationales can be envisaged. Their amount and time-profile can 
be calculated to compensate either the losses of oil exportation revenues (sectoral MC) or the 
drop of economic activity (macroeconomic MC) (Figure 7). 
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Figure 7. Monetary compensations  
 
 
The first option compensates the drop of exportation revenues due to the climate policy 
(dotted lines in Figure 7). To appreciate whether such transfers could be acceptable, we 
compare them with total North-South transfers for development aid as a point of comparison 
to appraise their acceptability in contributing countries. Considering the orders of magnitude, 
it is sufficient to observe that, the transfers would be close or even exceed 0.7% of GDP that 
is set as the UN target for global development aid for Middle-East only (diamond points in 
Figure 7). This shows that the compensation of exportation losses is highly unlikely for 
political reasons all the more so as they remain relatively low in the short-term when the core 
of macroeconomic losses is experienced.  
For these reasons, we exclude this type of compensations to consider instead that the transfers 
should compensate economic activity losses, measured by the reduction of Middle-East’s 
GDP (solid lines in Figure 7). They still represent a relatively important amount (around 
0.24% of OECD GDP on average over 2010-2050 in both scenarios), but they always remain 
well below the 0.7% benchmark. In IMACLIM-R, those transfers are taken from OECD 
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countries’ state budget in proportion of each country’s share in total OECD GDP, and are 
given to Middle-Eastern in the form of capital flows.  
The next sections assess the efficiency of such forms of compensations in their purpose to 
sustain Middle-East economy. They do so by investigating, analytically in section 4 and 
quantitatively in section 5, the mechanisms at play and the consequences of their 
implementation when a general equilibrium perspective is adopted.  
 
4. The macroeconomy of monetary transfers. An analytical detour 
Under a partial equilibrium framework, the additional revenue coming from monetary 
compensations would directly translate into an identical increase of domestic economic 
activity. But, when general equilibrium interactions are taken into account, the impact of 
monetary compensations becomes less straightforward because of their feedback effect on the 
terms-of-trade, which causes adjustments on international markets affecting domestic 
production and labour markets. 
This section proposes an analytical framework to isolate the general equilibrium effects of 
monetary transfers when these three dimensions of interaction are taken into account. The 
specifications used hereafter in equations (1), (2) and (3) are similar to the ones adopted in the 
IMACLIM-R for the representation of goods supply, labour markets and international trade (as 
described by equations (SM-7), (SM-10), (SM-19)-(SM-22) respectively in the 
Supplementary Material of (Waisman et al, 2012a)). 
 
4.1 Model specifications 
We consider an energy-exporting economy, which produces a composite good Q sold at price 
p and energy E sold at price pE.  
 21 
The composite good is produced with energy and labour as production factors. Unitary energy 
and labour requirements for production are defined by e and l, respectively, the wage rate is 
noted w and a mark-up rate π over production costs captures imperfect competition. The price 
level is then given by 
. . .Ep e p w l pπ= + +                                                   (1) 
Labour markets are described by a wage curve introducing an inverse relationship between 
the wage rate and unemployment.19 This means that the real wage level is an increasing 
function of the number of employed workers L lQ= : 
w
wL
p
α=                                                                (2) 
Here, w is a constant and 0α > is the elasticity of the wage curve: the higher α , the more 
flexible the labour markets.  
Finally, the trade balance for the composite good is an increasing function of the price 
differential between local prices p and world price pw: the higher the local production price 
(relatively to international levels), the more agents have incentives to rely on imported goods 
M and to reduce exportations X. For the sake of simplicity; we assume a simplified 
dependence between the trade balance wp M pX− and relative prices
w
p
p
: 
w
w
p
p M pX I
p
β − =                                                         (3) 
Here I is a constant and 0β >  is the elasticity of the trade balance to price differentials: the 
higher β the more the trade balance is sensitive to price variations. 
Setting the world price as the numéraire (pw=1), the equilibrium of the balance of payments 
gives: 
w E Ep M K pX p X T+ = + +                                              (4) 
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Here, K measures (relative) capital exportations and T represents the transfers received for 
compensation of the adverse impacts of the climate policy. 
 
4.2 Results and interpretation 
Capital export K is exogenously set (see discussion in section 1.3), and is therefore 
independent from the level of monetary transfers. Given the small size of transfers with 
respect to total income in oil-consuming countries (around 0.24% of OECD), we make the 
additional assumption that energy demand is not altered and hence that energy variables pE 
and XE are not affected by the introduction of monetary transfers.  
By noting p0 and Q0 the price and production levels in absence of monetary compensations, 
the Laspeyres index of economic activity, which measures GDP levels in quantity units after 
the introduction of monetary transfers, is defined by: 
0E EGDP p X p Q= +                                                        (5) 
We introduce the “efficiency index of monetary transfers”,
Tη , as the ratio of GDP variations 
due to monetary compensation over the amount of transfers:  
0
T
GDP GDP
T
η −=                                                         (6) 
A value Tη  means that 1$ in monetary compensation brings Tη $ of economic activity. Cases 
where 1Tη >  mean that monetary transfer have a more than proportional stimulating effect on 
economic activity, whereas on the contrary 1Tη <  mean that general equilibrium interactions 
trigger a negative feedback effect limiting the stimulation of economic activity.  
A direct calculation (see Appendix) gives 
 
( )1 1T vv uεη αβ−≈ −                                                        (7) 
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Here, three parameters characterizing the domestic economy (in terms of production 
structures and exposure to international competition) prove to play a crucial role: 
• 
0
Ep e
w l
ε = the ratio of energy costs to labour costs in production processes 
• 
0
E Ep Xv
GDP
= the dependence of the local economy on energy exportations. 
• 
E E
K
u
p X
= the relative importance of capital exports to energy exports. 
 
The effect of monetary transfers on ex-post economic activity is stronger, as captured by 
higher 
Tη , when (i) labor market rigidities are important (low α ) and production processes 
are energy-intensive (highε ). Under the assumption of equilibrated balance of payments, the 
transfers must be compensated by additional exports and hence a gain of competitiveness. 
Rigid labor markets mean that these adjustments do not affect significantly real wages and 
hence households’ purchase power, but rather rely on international effects on terms-of-trade. 
This is even truer in economies where labor represents a moderate share of production costs 
so that the efforts towards more competitive production processes affects through non-labor 
inputs; (ii) domestic sectors are less exposed to international trade, as captured by less intense 
competition on industrial goods (low β ), less dependence on energy exportation revenues 
(low v ) and high capital exports (high u). In this case indeed, monetary transfers play a 
minored role in the position of the local economy on international markets. 
Table 2 provides numerical assessments of 
Tη  when considering numerical values adopted in 
the IMACLIM-R model. Two general comments can be derived from this quantification. First, 
the efficiency of monetary transfers is far lower than one, which means that general 
equilibrium interactions under market imperfections (on labour markets, international trade 
and industrial production) limit the positive stimulus given by monetary transfers. Second, the 
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effect is stronger under the MF scenario, where exportation flows are relatively less important 
in economic activity than under the LD scenario. 
 
Table 2. Numerical values coming from the IMACLIM-R model. 
 α β u ε  ν Tη  
LD 
scenario 
0.55 7 1 * 0.46 0.42 0.16 
MF 
scenario 
0.55 7 1 * 0.46 0.32 0.25 
*given the assumption of gradual convergence of capital imbalances 
 
5. The macroeconomy of monetary transfers. A numerical assessment 
The analytical study proposed in previous section has permitted to demonstrate that the nature 
of macroeconomic adjustments, and in particular of market imperfections, importantly affects 
the consequences of monetary transfers. However, this simplified approach is not sufficient to 
give a comprehensive overview because it ignores both the dynamic effects (including 
technical change and learning-by-doing effects) and the structural dimensions (in particular 
the evolution from energy-intensive to low-carbon industries). To quantify more precisely 
these effects, we provide here assessments of monetary transfers in the multisectoral and 
dynamic approach defined by the IMACLIM-R model. 
The implementation of monetary transfers alters significantly GDP trajectories in both 
contributing countries (Figure 8a) and recipient countries (Figure 8b). On the one hand, the 
transfers unsurprisingly increase climate policy costs in OECD but the additional burden 
remains moderate. Long-term losses in 2050 range from 2% to 2.5% of GDP if transfers are 
implemented instead of 1% to 2% in absence of transfers (Figure 7a). On the other hand, the 
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monetary transfers help reducing the transitory costs induced in Middle-East countries down 
to 7.5% of GDP (in the MF scenario) or 9.5% (in the LD scenario) instead of 12.5% in the 
benchmark case (Figure 8b). This assessment confirms that, although the costs are reduced, 
the monetary transfers do not permit to offset completely the losses because their efficiency is 
limited by general equilibrium effects. This is confirmed by the quantitative estimates in the 
first column of Table 3 which feature positive, but significantly lower than one, values of the 
total efficiency index (0.21 and 0.63 in the LD and MF scenario, respectively).  
 
Figure 8. Relative GDP variations under climate policy (a) in OECD [left-hand panel]; (b) in Middle-East 
countries [right-hand panel] 
 
To identify the mechanisms behind these effects, we decompose the efficiency index 
according to domestic vs. trade activities (Table 3). More precisely, we define the domestic 
efficiency index ( )d
Tη  (resp. trade efficiency index ( )tTη ) by the variations of domestic activity 
(resp. trade balances) consecutive to the introduction of monetary transfers 
 
Table 3. “Efficiency index” of monetary transfers: ratio of variations due to monetary compensation over the 
amount of transfers 
 Tη  ( )dTη  ( )tTη  
LD scenario 0.21 0.91 -0.70 
MF scenario 0.63 0.68 -0.05 
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Monetary transfers foster importantly local activity with a positive (and close to one) 
efficiency index (0.91 in the LD scenario and 0.68 in the MF scenario). But this positive 
effect on local economic activity happens at the expense of a degradation of the trade balance 
with a negative value of the trade index in both scenarios (-0.70 in the LD scenario and -0.05 
in the MF scenario). This is due to a twofold trade effets. First, under the assumption of 
equilibrated balance of payments, additional national inflows in the form of transfers must be 
compensated by additional exports through terms-of-tarde adjustments on industrial goods. 
Second, oil exports are reduced because of lower wealth in oil-importing countries which 
contribute to the transfers. This negative effect is particularly important in the LD scenario 
because of high short-run oil prices: they delay investments in industrial production capacity 
in Middle-East countries, hence further undermining its competitiveness over the long term, 
and they induce oil-free technical change in oil-importing countries, hence increasing the oil 
price elasticity of OECD consumption and encouraging a drop of oil imports when their 
revenue is reduced by the transfers. Those numerical results confirm that in a context of 
limited flexibility of technical and economic adjustments and international trade interactions, 
monetary transfers might not prove as efficient as expected. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper discusses the question of compensation for the adverse impacts of a climate policy 
in a ‘thought’ experiment considering monetary transfers schemes and taking Middle-East 
countries as an example. This exercise helps pointing out mechanisms and orders of 
magnitude to identify the potentials and intrinsic limits of such approaches of compensation 
problems. Its major insight is about the impasses of a diplomatic language basing these 
compensations on observable indicators (here the oil exports) and ignoring the magnitude of 
the efficiency gap caused by general equilibrium effects. 
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In a general equilibrium model representing the interactions between oil markets and the 
macroeconomy, we first show a time-lag between losses of oil exports and of macroeconomic 
activity measured in GDP. Oil export losses remain moderate in the short term, especially 
under a ‘low deployment strategy’ of oil production, while the GDP losses can be very high 
because Middle-East countries cannot quickly adjust to very high increase of their (currently 
very low) domestic energy prices. This mismatch explains why compensating transfers based 
on oil revenue losses cannot solve the transition problem.  
But, even fine-tuning compensations according to GDP losses proves to compensate only 
partly the economic slowdown due to a carbon constraint because of general equilibrium 
feedbacks which undermine the macroeconomic efficiency of monetary transfers. This 
‘efficiency gap’ of transfers results in particular from the dependence of the domestic output 
to oil exportation revenues, the sensitivity of non energy sectors to price competition and the 
labour market rigidities which restrict the adaptive capacity of economies to changing 
conditions. 
In addition to this intrinsic limit to the effectiveness of transfers, our results show that the 
magnitude of the GDP losses to be compensated cannot rely on observable parameters since 
the magnitude of the efficiency gap of transfers is determined by the strategic choices of the 
Middle-East and also by the capacity of domestic policies to block Dutch disease 
mechanisms. 
These results show, beyond the specific case of oil exporters, the trap of reducing the 
compensation problem in climate negotiations to a question of monetary transfers. Other 
options are to be envisaged like technological transfers (Barrett, 2001, 2003) or innovative 
devices in climate finance (Hourcade et al. 2012) to ease the structural transition towards low 
carbon development paths and, in the case of Middle-East countries, towards the “beyond oil” 
era. 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1 It commits parties to give: “full consideration to [...] to the specific needs and concerns of developing country 
parties arising from the adverse effects of climate change and/or the impact of the implementation of response 
measures, especially on [...] countries whose economies are highly dependent on income generated from the 
production, processing and export of fossil fuels and associated energy-intensiveproducts”. 
2 It requires developed countries to implement their Kyoto commitments “in such a way so as to minimize 
adverse social, environmental and economic impacts on developing country parties”, particularly those 
identifiedin Articles 4.8 and 4.9 of the Convention. 
3, which recognizes “the potential impacts of response measures on countries particularly vulnerable to its 
adverse effects”. 
4 In a survey of modeling exercises, (Barnett et al., 2004) estimate that the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol 
would reduce oil exportation revenues by 9.8% to 13%, and decrease real income by up to 3% in 2010. At a 
longer term horizon, (Van Vuuren et al., 2003) estimate that a 550ppm target would induce a 35% decrease of oil 
revenues in OPEC countries in 2050 and (WBGU, 2003) obtains that the total abatement cost can reach 
approximately 2 per cent of GDP in Middle East at the same horizon. 
5 Some studies even obtain that a climate policy can be beneficial to the producers of conventional oil by 
affecting more the cost of their substitutes (unconventional oil, coal) (Persson et al., 2007) or by fostering an 
increase of conventional oil rents in OPEC if they can exert their market power (Johansson et al, 2009).  
6 See, among others, (Burnside & Dollar,2000; Guillaumont and Chauvet, 2001; Collier and  Dollar, 2002; 
Dalgaard et al, 2004; Minoiu and Reddy, 2010) 
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7 e.g., (Boone, 1996; Easterly et al., 2004; Easterly, 2005) 
8 The IMACLIM-R model has been used in several publications about oil markets (Rozenberg et al., 2010; 
Waisman et al, 2012b) and the comprehensive description of its analytical structure and numerical assumptions 
is given in (Waisman et al., 2012a) 
9 For an extensive discussion about production/cost functions in the energy field, see (Saunders, 2008)  
10 This iteration between the technical and production dimensions of the economy is a way to address the 
technical challenge to energy economists, raised by (Saunders, 2013), that is to “include measured, flexible 
cost/production functions […] and use measured technology gains for all factors of production”. 
 
11 The persistence of this market power under climate policy is conditional upon the ability of OPEC countries to 
elaborate coordinated strategies despite intra-cartel tensions caused by the lowering of oil revenues. In line with 
(Berg et al, 1997a)  who show that gains from cartelization are hardly impacted by global carbon taxes, we admit 
that the climate policy will not affect the cartel discipline. 
12 For example, in a historical study of capital flows over the long term (1865-1992), (Hogendorn, 1998) 
demonstrates that no simple rule emerges for capital flows dynamics, given the fluctuations of capital mobility 
over time in parallel with different phases of international monetary and financial governance: high capital 
mobility during the gold standard period (1880-1913), almost closed economies during the Interwar and Bretton 
Woods periods (1914-1969) and increasing mobility in the modern period (1970-1992). 
13 The issue of capital mobility has given rise to a large controversy since the econometric study by (Feldstein 
and Horioka, 1980), who demonstrated low capital mobility over 1960-1974, in contradiction with widely shared 
ideas. This ‘puzzle’ was the starting point of a large body of literature trying to identify the major drivers of 
capital flows, but which has failed to reach consensual answers (see (Apergis and Tsoumas, 2009) for a survey).  
14 We do not consider the case where Middle-East countries withdraw from the climate policy, since this would 
make the debate on monetary compensations, at the core of the present study, irrelevant.   
15 (Luderer et al, 2012) analyses the effect of alternative regional distribution of emission allowances on climate 
policy costs. 
16 eg, (Waisman et al, 2012a) on the role of technical, resource and behavioral assumptions; (Tavoni et al, 2012) 
on the sensitivity to the availability of certain technologies (Nuclear, CCS, renewable); or (Guivarch et al, 2011) 
on the role of labor market rigidities. 
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17 (Waisman et al, 2012b) obtains for example that, in absence of climate policy, Middle-East producers would 
prefer the MF scenario only if their discount rate is lower than 6%. 
18 Note that this effect is measured under the assumption that Middle-East governments maintain the current 
levels of energy subsidies but do not seek to increase it to offset the increase of fuel prices due to the climate 
policy because it would involve a non-affordable amount for public spending 
19 Microeconometric evidence for such formulation was given in a seminal contribution by (Blanchflower and 
Oswald 1995) and extensive theories have been developed to support such representation of the labour market 
(see (Layard et al., 2005) for an overview). The basic idea is that high unemployment represents an outside threat 
that leads workers to accept lower wages as from either the bargaining approach (Layard and Nickell, 1986) or 
the wage-efficiency approach (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix: analytical resolution of model in Section 4 
To simplify notations, we introduce:  
• 
E E
T
x
p X
= the ratio of monetary transfers over total energy exportation revenues, which 
measures the magnitude of monetary transfers.  
• 
0
E Ep Xv
GDP
= the dependence of the local economy on energy exportations. 
• 
E E
K
u
p X
= the relative importance of capital exports to energy exports. 
• 
0
Ep e
w l
ε = the ratio of energy costs to labour costs in production processes. 
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Combining (5) and (6), we have: 
0
1 1
1T
v Q
x v Q
η  − = −                                                      (A-1) 
By introducing w0 the wage rate in absence of transfers (T=0), a direct calculation with (1)-(4) 
gives 
1
0
1 1 1
1
Q x
Q u
α βε −     = + − +    −                                          (A-2) 
By reporting (A-2) into (A-1), we obtain: 
( ) 111 11 1 1 1 1
. 1
T v x
x v u
αβη ε −       = − + − + −    −      
                   (A-3) 
Under the assumption that, for large energy exporters the transfers are small compared to total 
exportation revenues ( 1x ), equation (A-3) can be simplified in: 
( )1 1T vv uεη αβ−≈ −                                            (A-4) 
